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1 Introduction
The optimal conduct of monetary policy, whether to target the money growth rate or
the ination rate, has survived as one of the most contentious issues in monetary eco-
nomics. Popular until recently, Milton Friedmans (1960) mechanical monetarism
advised central banks to stop setting interest rates and instead set the money growth
rate permanently at the estimated growth rate of the real economy. Since the 80s,
however, the dominant paradigm in the practice of monetary policy has shifted, bring-
ing with it a renewed dedication to price stabilityvia the direct control of ination
via interest rate targeting.
Poole (1970) presented the rst formal treatment of the larger question: how
should a monetary authority decide whether to use the money stock or the interest
rate as the policy instrument. The debate at the time, as summarized by Poole,
took the following shape: while some argued that monetary policy should set the
money stock while letting the interest rate uctuate as it will, others believed that
monetary authorities should push interest rates up in times of boom, and down in
times of recession, while the money supply is allowed to uctuate as it will.Poole
employed a stochastic IS-LM model and used volatility of aggregate output as the
basis for comparison. He reached the conclusion that if disturbances originated
primarily in the IS function that summarized the real sectors of the economy [...], the
money stock is the proper control instrument. But if the LM function, representing
the monetary sector, is the source of the disturbances, the interest rate is the proper
control variable (Poole and Lieberman, 1972). The bottom-line advice was clear
and extremely inuential: when the shocks are real in nature, x the money supply;
if the shocks are monetary, x the interest rate.
In this paper, we broaden the scope of the original instrument problemwithin
a modern optimizing framework and pose two questions of policy relevance.1 First,
1Our goal is not to updatePooles results in a optimizing framework; rather to use his exercise
as an inspiration to pose additional instrument problems.
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when the shocks are real, does it matter whether they impinge on output or the real
interest rate? Or more broadly, does it matter whether they are real income or real
price shocks? Second, does the persistence of these shocks matter for the conduct
of monetary policy? Our goal is strictly qualitative  to understand how optimal
monetary policy (money growth and ination rate targeting) should respond to real
shocks and their persistence in a exible-price microfoundedmodel of money.2
To that end, we study a two-period lived two-island symmetric pure-exchange
overlapping generations model in the tradition of Townsend (1987) where limited
communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for
at money. The competing asset to money is a commonly-available linear one-period
storage technology. At the end of each period, a fraction of agents is relocated from
one island to the other and they are allowed to bring only cash with them. This
assumption solves the return-dominance problem of money. Risk averse agents seek
insurance against this relocation risk. This justies a role for generational banks that
take deposits and holds a portfolio of cash reserves and storage on behalf of their
clientele.
We study two variants of this model, one in which the young-age endowment and
one where the return to the storage technology is exclusively random. We model these
as AR(1) processes because our goal here is to study how changes in shockspersis-
tence a¤ect the optimal policy responses and the relative desirability of alternative
instruments. For consistency, however, we ensure that the unconditional distributions
of these processes remain invariant to such changes. This requires that the variance
of innovations decline as the persistence of shocks increases.
Typically, with either uncertain endowment or real interest rate, banks will care
not just about the current values of these variables but also their future realizations.
2Almost all the work done in this area has a quantitative focus and employ models with sticky or
staggered prices, and very few, use welfare criteria see Woodford (2003). Our approach is to ask:
sans the added complexity of sticky prices, what can a reasonable neoclassical exible-price model
of money have to say about optimal monetary policy design?
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For example, a bank this period cares about next periods endowment realization
because the latter will potentially inuence that periods money demand and hence
the price level and therefore a¤ect the return on money between this period and the
next. But next periods money demand depends on the following periods endowment,
and so on. We assume all agents know the relevant distributions of these shocks and
form expectations about the returns on money and storage. If shocks are persistent,
these expectations will be conditional on the current realizations. We focus solely on
long run stationary equilibria under which agents expectations are coordinated across
time, i.e., expectations of one generation are validated by the behavior of the next
and so on ad innitum.
In the case of endowment shocks, and with logarithmic (henceforth log) utility,
we prove that irrespective of the degree of persistence, the optimal monetary target
is a zero money growth rule while the optimal ination rate target involves some
ination. We also show that monetary targeting welfare-dominates ination-rate
targeting but the gap between the two (i.e., the relative desirability of monetary
targeting) reduces as the shocks become more persistent. In the limit, when the
shocks to the endowment approach a random walk, the instrument problem vanishes:
the two instruments become welfare-equivalent. We demonstrate numerically that
similar results hold for more general CRRA preferences: as persistence rises, smaller
policy responses in terms of money growth or ination rate changes are needed, and
the welfare gap between the two monetary regimes shrinks.
Results under real interest rate shocks are strikingly di¤erent. For log utility,
irrespective of the persistence of shocks, both monetary and ination targeting are
equivalent and the optimal money growth rate/ination rate in either case is zero.
For more general CRRA utility, in sharp contrast to the result under endowment
shocks, monetary targeting and ination targeting are welfare-equivalent only in the
limit when the shocks become i.i.d.! The magnitude of the policy response under
either regime (money growth rate or ination rate targeting) as well as the welfare
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gap between the two increases with the persistence of these shocks. The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of consumption plays a critical role here. As in the case of
endowment shocks, an optimal ination rate under real interest shocks is always non-
negative, but optimal money growth rate is negative only when consumption is elastic
(relative to log); else, it is positive. More interestingly, ination targeting dominates
monetary targeting when consumption is elastic (relative to log); otherwise, the latter
performs better.
The upshot is that even in exible-price environments, the nature of real shocks 
whether they impinge on output or the interest rate and their persistence, matter
crucially for optimal monetary policy design. An information about the nature of the
shock alone is no longer su¢ cient.
The random relocation with limited communication model was popularized by
Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1997) and has been used to investigate myriad
monetary policy issues in Schreft and Smith (1997), Smith (2002), Antinol, Huybens,
and Keister (2001), Antinoland Keister (2006), Gomis-Porqueras and Smith (2003),
Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005), Haslag and Martin (2007), among many
others. The random relocation model is attractive because it includes a genuine
reason why money is held even when dominated in return; it also allows for easy
inclusion of institutions such as Diamond-Dybvig (1983) style banks. Another strong
appeal of this model is its analytical tractability. To date, however, researchers have
either worked with deterministic versions of the model such as Gomis-Porqueras and
Smith (2003)or at best, with i.i.d. shocks, as in Bhattacharya and Singh (2007).3
Independent of its aforediscussed contribution to the area of optimal monetary policy
design, our paper makes strides in the analytical treatment of persistent shocks in
this popular model of money.
A paper close in spirit to ours is Kryvtsov et. al. (2007). In an overlapping gener-
3The current paper is in some respects a companion piece to Bhattacharya and Singh (2007).
However, allowing for persistent AR(1) shocks and adding shocks to the real interest rate makes the
current analysis considerably more general and formidable.
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ations economy similar in some respects to ours, they show that increased persistence
of endowment shocks requires a smaller inationary intervention. This is primarily
because with higher persistence, the transitory component of the shock becomes less
important.4 Although our policy results for the case of endowment shocks have a
similar avor, the underlying reasons are somewhat di¤erent. In our set up sans
shocks, as is well known, a xed money supply (or equivalently, a constant price of
consumption) is the optimal policy.5 It is only when the shocks induce banks to de-
viate from the steady state allocations that a need for optimal policy to deviate from
the xed money supply rule arises. In particular, the higher the impact of shocks,
the higher will be the required deviation. A higher persistence essentially reduces
the (conditional) uncertainty of next periods endowment and therefore price level
uncertainty is reduced. Consequently, irrespective of the monetary regime, the policy
response becomes less aggressive. In contrast, when the shocks impinge on the real
interest rate, we nd that the policy response can become more aggressive with in-
creased persistence. Here, if the returns are i.i.d., current realizations (on investments
made last period) are irrelevant for the investment choices of the current generation.
Instead, if these returns are persistent, their expectational relevance for the next
periods return makes current investments contingent on current realizations. As a
result, investments into cash uctuate over time. Indeed, the higher the persistence,
the more volatile are the cash balances. Consequently, policy responses strengthen
4In their model, agents precautionarilycarry more money than what is optimal from a planners
perspective. Therefore, to discourage such savings, the optimal ination rate is positive. With i.i.d.
shocks, all changes are temporary and the precautionary motive is strong. The higher the current
endowment, the stronger is the precautionary motive, and the higher is the optimal ination rate.
With persistence, a change in endowment has a permanent component that does not require a
proportionalprecautionary response. The policy need not discourage savings as aggressively. As
a result, the volatility of optimal ination declines with the persistence of shocks.
5In equilibrium, relocated old agents use money to purchase out of the endowment deposited by
the current young. From a planners perspective, ex-ante, what is consumed by the relocated agents
can not be stored. The social (planners) opportunity cost of moversconsumption relative to that
of non-movers is thus the lost return on storage. In a decentralized economy, this is implemented
by keeping the money supply xed, i.e., a zero net return on money. See Bhattacharya and Singh
(forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.
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with shock persistence.
Gomis-Porqueras and Smith (2003) also study output and real interest rate uc-
tuations; specically, they consider two-period deterministic cycles of output, real
interest rate, and relocation shocks. They show that real interest rate shocks re-
quire relatively higher nominal interest rate smoothing than do endowment shocks.
The result relies critically on their assumption of elastic (relative to log) utility. We
show that the ranking of interest rate targeting vis-à-vis monetary targeting crucially
depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Moreover, not only do we
evaluate the best rule within each monetary regime, we also explicitly rank the two
regimes, something that they do not.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the
baseline model and characterize decentralized allocations. In Section 3, we study the
role of endowment uncertainty in shaping the optimal choice of monetary instruments.
In Section 4, we do the same with real interest rate shocks. Both these sections also
include the results from the computational experiments under CRRA utility. Section
5 concludes. Proofs of all major results are in the appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
We present a model economy that is populated by a unit mass of two-period over-
lapping generations of agents located in two spatially separated locations.6 Time is
denoted by t = 1; 2; ::;1. Each two-period-lived agent is endowed with wt > 0 units
of this good at date t when young and nothing when old. We assume w is stochastic
and that w is revealed at the start of any date; the specics are provided below in
Section 3.
6Our formulation follows Townsend (1987), and Schreft and Smith (1997). Only a concise de-
scription of the environment is provided here; the reader is referred to Schreft and Smith (1997) for
details.
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Only old-age consumption is valued. Let ct denote old-age consumption of the
members of the generation born at date t; their lifetime utility is given by u(c) =
c1    1 =(1  ); with > 0; and u(c) = ln c when  = 1:
All agents have access to two assets, storage and money. Each unit of the con-
sumption good put into storage at date t yields xt+1 units of the consumption good
at date t + 1. We assume x is stochastic and that it is revealed at the start of any
date; the specics are provided below in Section 4. The other asset is at currency
(money) that agents may acquire through sale of their endowment. Let pt denote the
price level at date t. Then the gross real rate of return on money (Rmt) between
period t and t+1 is given by Rmt = pt=pt+1 = 1t , where t denotes the ination rate
between period t and t + 1. We will assume that money is dominated in its return
(see below).
The sequence of events is as follows. Agents receive their endowment at the start
of a period. Towards the end of the period, after the savings decisions have been
made, a fraction  of randomly chosen agents from each location is relocated to the
other location: A relocated agent cannot collect the return on any goods she has
stored, or that have been stored on her behalf, since goods cannot be transported
across locations. However, if an agent is carrying at currency when she is relocated,
then the currency is relocated with it.
Young agents may either invest their endowment directly into one or both the
assets or go through a bank that takes deposits and invests in these assets; the specics
of the banksproblem will follow later. Under standard assumptions discussed in
Schreft and Smith (1997), agents will nd it in their best interest to deposit their
entire endowment into a bank before they learn their relocation status. The bank
pools the goods deposited by all the young agents and uses them to acquire a portfolio
of stored goods and at currency. It issues claims to agents whose nature, timing,
and size are contingent on their relocation status. If an agent does not get relocated
(henceforth, a non-mover), she gets a return on her deposit next period funded by the
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goods the bank has stored. If she gets relocated (henceforth, a mover), then she gets
a return on her deposit in the same period in the form of a at currency payment
(whose real value will depend on the following periods price level) funded by the
banks holdings of at currency.
The quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t  1, per young agent, is
denotedMt. Let mt Mt=pt denote real money balances at date t. The government
conducts monetary policy in one of two possible ways. The rst, called monetary
targeting, is one where the government changes the nominal stock of at currency
at a xed non-stochastic gross rate  > 0 per period, so that Mt = Mt 1 for all
t. The second, called ination targeting, is one where the government changes the
nominal stock of at currency in such a way as to keep the long-run gross ination
rate xed at : All money injections are implemented through lump sum transfers
() to the young agents. The period t budget constraint of the government is
 t =
Mt  Mt 1
pt
= mt  mt 1Rm;t 1 (1)
for all t  1.
2.2 The banks problem
The asset holdings of young agents are assumed to be costlessly intermediated by
perfectly competitive banks. Under this assumption, banksequilibrium prots from
any generation is zero. One can equivalently think of banks being created each period
by the current cohort of agents who wish to maximize the ex-ante overall return on
their cash-storage portfolio while keeping su¢ cientcash for the movers.
Specically, every young agent deposits her after-tax/transfer income in the bank.
The banks divide their deposits between stored goods st and real balances of at
currency mt, so that
wt +  t = mt + st . (2)
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At the time the bank solves its problem, the current endowment wt and the return
xt on goods stored during previous period is known; so is the equilibrium price level
pt. But wt+1, xt+1, and pt+1 has not been realized yet. The bank cares about xt+1
as it directly a¤ects the consumption of non-movers. Additionally, as xt+1 helps
predict xt+2, it may also inuence the next periods money demand and the price
level, which in turn a¤ects the rate of return on money between this period and the
next. The indirect e¤ect also holds for wt+1 through its e¤ect on the next periods
money demand.
Evidently the bank cannot promise a xed real return to its depositors. All it can
do is let the depositors know the amount of nominal balances being kept aside for
their use on the other island. The bank knows the stochastic process for wt+1 and
xt+1 and forms expectations on the return on money Rmt; in a rational expectations
equilibrium, these expectations are correct. We focus solely on long-run stationary
equilibria under which expectations are coordinated across time, i.e., expectations of
one generation are validated by the behavior of the next and so on ad innitum.
Dene t  mtwt+ t as the ratio of cash reserves to deposits. Below, when we specify
shock processes, we also provide conditions to ensure that money is dominated in
return by storage. Then the bank will never want to carry cash balances across time.
In that case, the banks problem is given by
max
t2[0;1]
Et

u
t

Rmt (wt +  t)

+(1  )Et

u

(1  t)xt+1
(1  ) (wt +  t)

; (3)
where Et is an expectations operator conditional on date t information. Let cmt 
t

(wt +  t) and cnt  1 t1  (wt +  t) ; the consumption allocations o¤ered by the bank
to its moving and non-moving clientele. The rst order condition for this problem is
given by
Et (u
0 (cmt) Rmt) = Et (xt+1  u0 (cnt)) : (4)
Eq. (4) equates the expected marginal value of a unit of endowment saved as cash
with its expected marginal value were it instead kept in storage.
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Under CRRA preferences, i.e., u (c) = c
1  1
1  with  > 0, the rst order condition
to the banks problem reduces to
 t Et

R1 mt

= (1  ) [(1  t)] Et

x1 t+1

; (5)
which further simplies to
t =

+ (1  )

Et(R1 mt )
Et(x1 t+1 )
  1

: (6)
Monetary policy inuences the optimal  since it determines the relative return on
money (Rm).
It is possible to make further analytical progress under the assumption of loga-
rithmic utility. The banks problem is now rewritten as
max
t2[0;1]

Et (lnRmt) +  ln
t


+ (1  ) ln

1  t
1  

+ (1  )Et (xt+1) + ln (wt +  t)

:
(7)
Observe that the bank knows the current period endowment and takes the return on
money and the size of the transfer as given. Therefore, the banks choice of  will to
respond only to the second and the third terms of the previous expression. Then, the
choice of t is given by
t =  for all t; (8)
which, of course, may also be obtained from (6) by substituting  = 1. As is well
known, with logarithmic utility, banks allocate deposits across the two assets to pro-
vide consumption to the two types in proportion to their population shares. As a
result, the choice of  is not state-contingent. This will not be the case in the more
general CRRA formulation, as is evident from (6).
2.3 Equilibrium under monetary and ination targeting
Enroute to solving for optimal monetary rules, we describe the monetary equilibrium
under the two targeting rules. Undermonetary targeting, the government xes the
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money growth rate at : Since  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt

1  1


and mt = t (wt +  t) ;
we have
mt =
twt
1  t

1  1

 ; wt +  t = wt
1  t

1  1

 : (9)
Hence, the equilibrium return on money is given by
Rmt =
mt+1
mt
=
1

t+1wt+1
twt
1  t

1  1


1  t+1

1  1

 : (10)
With logarithmic utility, t =  for all t (see (8)), and the above reduces to Rmt =
1

wt+1
wt
.
Given the exogenous process for fx;wg and money growth rate , a stationary
equilibrium of this economy consists of a time-invariant portfolio allocation function
 (wt; xt) and a return function Rmt (given by (9) and (10)) such that given Rmt,
 (wt; xt) solves the banksproblem (3) and
Rmt =
1

 (xt+1; wt+1)wt+1
 (xt; wt)wt
1   (xt; wt)

1  1


1   (xt+1; wt+1)

1  1

 : (11)
Under ination targeting, the government xes the ination rate at : The real
return to money is
Rmt =
1

: (12)
Here, there is no uncertainty about the rate of return on money. The government
conducts monetary policy via time-varying taxes and transfers to ensure money is
an asset with a xed real return. Since  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt   mt 1 ; we get mt =
t (wt +  t) = t
 
wt +mt   mt 1

implying
mt =   t
(1  t)
mt 1 +
t
1  t
wt (13)
Thus, real balances follow an AR(1) process under ination targeting. For future
reference, under log utility with t = , (13) reduces to
mt =  mmt 1 +

1  wt (14)
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where m  1 1  is the persistence term.
A stationary equilibrium of this economy is described by a time-invariant portfolio
allocation function  () ; that given  and the stochastic process for x solves banks
problem described by equation (3) given by (6). The solution leads to a stationary
process for real money demand governed by (13).
As discussed in Bhattacharya and Singh (forthcoming), in steady states, a planner
constrained by limited communication faces a return of x on stored goods; such
a planner who allocates w between the movers and the non-movers would choose
an allocation (cm; cn) so as to maximize  u(cm) + (1  ) u(cn) subject to cm +
(1  ) cn=x = w: The marginal condition is
u0 (cm) = x  u0 (cn) :
This is the intratemporal e¢ ciencyor intragenerational e¢ ciencycondition con-
necting marginal utilities of movers and non-movers at any date. In a steady state, a
government trying to replicate the planning solution would face a static problem and
hence would need to pay attention solely to this intratemporal margin. With shocks,
however, the governments problem does not remain static. An intertemporal (inter-
generational) margin appears because shocks hit di¤erent generations asymmetrically.
Now the government pays attention to providing some amount of intergenerational
insurance. To achieve this, the government may opt to trade o¤ intratemporal for
intertemporal e¢ ciency and this causes optimal monetary policy to deviate from
whatever policy achieves intratemporal e¢ ciency alone.
A road-map of what lies ahead is in order. We start by analyzing the optimal
monetary rules under monetary and ination targeting policies in the case where
endowments follow an AR(1) process but storage return is xed. We are able to
derive clean analytical results for the case of logarithmic utility. We go on to compare
stationary welfare across the two targeting policies. We then repeat these exercises
in the case where the endowment is xed but the return to storage follows an AR(1)
process. In both cases, we extend the scope of our results to the case of CRRA utility
13
by means of numerical computations.
3 Endowment uncertainty
We start o¤ by xing the return on storage to x for all dates and allowing the endow-
ment process to be stochastic. Shocks to the endowment are intended to represent
real output shocks. Our goal is to investigate how optimal monetary policy responds
to such shocks, and in particular, to the persistence of such shocks.
We assume that wt follows an AR(1) process of the form:
wt = wwt 1 + "t; (15)
where " is i.i.d. with mean (1  w) w and variance (1  2w) 2w, and where w and 2w
are the unconditional mean and variance of the endowment process. This specication
allows us to study how optimal policies vary with the persistence (w) of the shocks
while keeping the unconditional mean and variance of these shocks constant. We also
assume that x >
w

+ (1  w) wewmin . This ensures that x > Et (Rmt) always holds,
and banks never carry cash for the non-movers.
We adopt an ex-ante measure of welfare. This allows us to obtain the stochastic
analog of the golden rule in a stochastic overlapping generations economy with nitely
lived agents. Here, a generations welfare is dened as its lifetime expected utility
where an unconditional expectation is taken with respect to stationary distributions
of exogenous as well as endogenous variables. This measure, by construction, treats
all generations symmetrically and makes each of them representative. The uncon-
ditional expectation ensures that the derived policy rules are state-uncontingent or
timeless.
We rst consider the optimal money growth rate under monetary targeting, then
characterize the optimal ination rate under ination targeting, and nally establish
a ranking between the two.
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3.1 Monetary targeting
Monetary policy has di¤erent e¤ects on the two groups, movers and non-movers. The
latters consumption is given by x(wt+  t) while the formersby Rmt(wt+  t): Using
(9), it is easily veried that the consumption of non-movers is given by cnt = xwt1 +

and that of the movers by cmt = 1
wt+1
1 +

. Then, indirect utility as a function of  at
t is obtained by evaluating (7) at t =  and using the equilibrium return given by
(10):
Wt () = Et flnwt+1jwtg+(1  ) ln (xwt)  ln

1  

1  1


  ln: (16)
Notice that  has no e¤ect on the rst two terms on the r.h.s. of the welfare expression.
Ex-ante stationary aggregate welfare is dened as W   E fW ()g where E is the
unconditional expectation. Thus, we have
W  = (1  ) ln x+ E (lnw)  ln

1  

1  1


   ln (17)
What  is the best from the standpoint of stationary welfare? We dene ~ 
argmax fW g. Since W  is assumed to be concave in , ~ solves d
d
W  = 0; [notice
~ maximizes the last two terms in (17)]. For future reference, we dene ~W  
max

W .
Proposition 1 Under logarithmic utility, irrespective of w, the optimal monetary
policy is to keep the money supply xed, i.e., ~ = 1.
Notice from equation (16) that the terms containing  are independent of both
the current and/or future endowment. In that case, optimal monetary policy can
safely ignore the aforediscussed intergenerational margin and work solely to reach an
e¢ cient intragenerational margin.
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3.2 Ination targeting
The stochastic process for real balances under ination targeting as given by (14) can
be rewritten as
mt =  mmt 1 +

1   wt =

1  
1X
s=0
( m)swt s:
This, when combined with the AR(1) process for endowments, yields
mt =

1  
" 1X
s=0
sw"t s   m
1X
s=1
s 1w "t s + 
2
m
1X
s=2
s 2w "t s   3m
1X
s=3
s 3w "t s + ::::
#
:
Denote the mean and variance of the stochastic process for m dened in (14) by
m and 2m respectively. The following lemma contains some pertinent information
about the mean and variance of the stochastic process for m:
Lemma 1 For log utility, under ination targeting, the mean and the variance of the
stochastic process for real balances are given by:
m =

1  
w
1 + m
;
2m =
2
(1  )2
2
w
 
1  2w

1 +
1
(w + m)
2

4w
1  2w
  2 
2
m
2
w
1 + wm
+
4m
1  2m

(18)
Moreover, the variance declines monotonically with w.
Since the unconditional mean and variance, w and 2w, are xed, Lemma 1 shows
that the variance of real balances or equivalently net-of-transfer income (recall that
w +  = m=) depends on the persistence of the endowment process and the persis-
tence of monetary process. Notice however, that mean real balances depends solely
on m and not on w.
The following lemma, which compares w
w
with m
m
; will permit further progress
towards evaluation of the optimal ination target and comparison across the two
targeting schemes.
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Lemma 2 As w increases
m
m
=w
w
declines. In particular,
2m
(me)2
2w
(we)2
=
((1 )+)2
(1 )22 2 > 1 for w = 0
((1 )+)2
(1 )22+2 > 1 for all w = m 2 (0; 1)
1 as w ! 1
9>>>=>>>;
Thus, when endowment shocks are highly persistent, the per-unit variance of net-of-
transfer income approaches that of the endowment process.
Under ination targeting, there is no uncertainty regarding the return on money.
The only remaining uncertainty is about the net-of-transfer income which is the sum
of the endowment and the transfer income. When the persistence of the endowment
process increases, it gains relatively higher importance (relative to the stochastic
process for money balances which determines the transfer income) in the determina-
tion of the net-of-transfer income. In the limit, as the endowment process becomes a
random walk, the signicance of monetary process vanishes completely. As the un-
conditional variance of the endowment process is constant, a reduction in the relative
importance of monetary process reduces the unconditional variance of the net-of-
income process. An increase in the persistence of endowment process thus makes
ination targeting more desirable, as will become clear further below.
Evaluating (7) at t =  and using (12) obtains indirect utility at date t as
Wt () =   ln +(1  ) ln x+ ln (wt +  t) =   ln +(1  ) ln x+ ln
mt


:
It is apparent that  has two e¤ects on welfare, one through its e¤ect on the return
on money (captured by the   ln  term above) and the other via its e¤ect on post-
tax/transfer income (captured by the ln (wt +  t) or ln
 
mt


terms above).
Having characterized the rst and second moment properties of the net-of-transfer
income under ination targeting, we are now ready to study the properties of an
optimal ination target. To do so, we rst dene the ex ante stationary aggregate
welfare as
W   E (W ()) =   ln    ln+ (1  ) ln x+ E (lnm) : (19)
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Notice that the last term on the r.h.s. of (19) corresponds to E(ln (wt +  t)) or
the mean value of log post tax income. We dene the optimal ination rate as
~  argmax fW g and its corresponding welfare as ~W   max

fW g. Henceforth,
we assume that W  is strictly concave in ; then ~ solves d
d
W  = 0.
Proposition 2 Under logarithmic utility, optimal ination targeting involves setting
a positive ination rate, or ~ > 1 for all w 2 [0; 1). Furthermore, limw!1 ~ = 1.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on a second-order Taylor approximation of the
last term on the r.h.s. of (19) around m.7 An intuition for this result is as follows. The
rst thing to note is that while ination targeting eliminates rate of return uncertainty,
the uncertainty about the post-tax/transfer income
 
w +  = m


remains. A risk-
averse agent would thus prefer to have the highest expected value form with minimum
accompanying volatility. It can be checked from Lemmas 1 and 2 that raising ination
rate achieves both objectives, it follows that choosing a positive ination rate ( > 1)
may be desirable.
Intuitively, in order to give mt

to date t movers the government will have to tax
the date t+ 1 young such that their storage allocation, (1  ) (wt+1 +  t+1) ; leaves
mt

of goods for date t movers consumption. In other words, taxes/transfers should
be such that (1  ) (wt+1 +  t+1) = wt+1   mt . This is the rationale behind (14),
which is rewritten below as
(wt+1 +  t+1) =   
(1  ) (wt +  t) +
1
1  wt+1: (20)
Equation (20) makes clear that the autocorrelation between total income at two
adjacent periods is negative and the strength of this correlation becomes smaller as
 rises. Thus setting  > 1 may improve intertemporal e¢ ciency; this way shocks to
income do not get transmitted over time as easily.
Proposition 2 also states that as the persistence of endowment shock increases,
the optimal ination target approaches unity. This directly follows the results stated
7Observe that E lnm = ln m  12 
2
m
m2 and this is where Lemma 2 helps.
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in Lemma 2. As the persistence of endowment process gets larger the per unit net of
transfer income volatility under ination targeting approaches that of the endowment
process. As a result, the policy correction through ination needs to be less aggressive.
We now proceed to answer the question: which targeting regime, set at its own
optimal rate, achieves higher welfare?
Proposition 3 Under logarithmic utility, optimal targeting of the money growth rate
is stationary-welfare superior to optimal targeting of the ination rate for all w < 1.
The welfare gap between the two regimes shrinks as w increases; as w ! 1, both
regimes are stationary-welfare equivalent.
Recall that optimal monetary targeting involves setting  = 1 (xing the money
supply) thereby making the post-tax/transfer income exactly equal to the endow-
ment. In this setting, as discussed earlier, both non-moversand moversconsumption
variability is solely due to the endowment uncertainty. On the other hand, optimal
ination targeting involves xing the ination rate thereby eliminating any uncer-
tainty with respect to the return on money; the residual uncertainty, in this case, is
with regard to the post-tax/transfer income.
Why is monetary targeting superior? A xed money supply rule achieves ex-
ante intratemporal e¢ ciency; it does/can not a¤ect the fundamental endowment
uncertainty, captured by 2w. Compare this to a zero net ination rate policy. Of
course, as we have seen,  = 1 can achieve ex-ante intratemporal e¢ ciency; however,
it is associated with a higher volatility of post-tax income. In order to reduce the
per unit volatility of net-of-transfer income
 
m
m

,  needs to be increased. The
optimal  thus trades o¤ intratemporal e¢ ciency against the benet received from the
reduction in income volatility. Yet, as Lemma 2 shows, for any degree of persistence of
endowment shocks, the per-unit volatility of net-of-transfer income under any ination
rate is higher than the endowment volatility, which equals the net-of-transfer income
volatility under monetary targeting. Overall, relative to monetary targeting, optimal
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ination targeting distorts the intratemporal e¢ ciency margin and additionally leaves
the net-of-transfer income more volatile. This makes its less desirable overall.
Proposition 3 also states that as the persistence of endowment process increases,
the welfare under ination targeting approaches that achievable under monetary tar-
geting. Once again, the result follows from Lemma 2. As w increases, the volatility
of net-of-transfer income under ination targeting decreases and the welfare gap ac-
cordingly shrinks. When the endowment process is a random walk, the signicance
of the monetary process in net-of-transfer income determination completely vanishes,
and net-of-transfer income volatility not only equals that of endowment volatility, but
is also independent of the ination rate. Since intratemporal e¢ ciency is ensured, the
ination rate instrument can play no additional role. As under monetary targeting,
it is optimal to have ~ = 1; hence, an identical welfare is obtained.
3.3 CRRA utility
We now extend our analysis to incorporate the more general CRRA utility form:
u(c) =

c1    1 =(1   ) where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Our
objective here is to verify whether the avor of the results from Section 3 continue to
obtain for  away from unity. Since it is not possible to pursue this analytically, we
will resort to numerical analysis below.
By combining (5) with (3), the expression for period t welfare is given by
Wt 
(1  ) (wt +  t)1  (1  t) Et

x1 t+1

  1
1   =


t

(wt +  t)
1 Et (Rmt)  1
1   :
(21)
Under monetary targeting t (wt), wt +  t; and Rmt are given by (6), (9), and (10),
respectively. Thus, for given probability distributions for  and w, the equilibrium
function  is obtained as a xed point of (6). Evidently, under monetary targeting,
the equilibrium t [denoted t ()] is a function of , and the period t realization
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of w. Under ination targeting Rm =  1. Then  is obtained from (6), and then
wt +  t =
mt

is obtained from (13).
Next, the optimal policies and optimal welfare levels are dened as
~W i  max
i

W i
	
, ~{  argmaxW i	 ; i 2 f; g
Finally, we represent ~W i in terms of its consumption equivalent ~ci by using
~W i =
h 
~ci
1    1i = (1  ) :
Our choice of parametric specication is as follows. We x  = 0:2 and assume
that the long-run distribution of w is log-normal. For the AR(1) specication, we
assume
lnwt = w lnwt 1 + "t,
where "  N ( (1  w) ; 2 (1  2w)) ; w = 0 obviously nests the i.i.d. specication.
Below we present results for w = 0; 0:5, and 0.9. In particular, we compare optimal
money growth and ination rates under the two policies, along with their respective
welfare levels, for  2 [0:5; 2:1].8
A few words about the computational algorithm is in order. Under monetary
targeting, the main step entails computing the xed point of  as a function of w,
depending on the nature of the shock. To do so, we guess an initial function,9 and
numerically iterate on (6) to convergence. This is done for a xed . Once the 
function is obtained, evaluating (21) by averaging over a large number of simulations
obtains the ex-ante welfare. By repeating this exercise for di¤erent values of , we
easily obtain ~ and ~W . Under ination targeting, we rst x . This yields 
directly. After assuming an initial value of m0 = me, we let the computer simulate
(13), and for each observation of  or w; and m compute (21). An average obtained
8We nd that  2 [0:5; 2:1] is a fairly representative range, and the qualitative nature of our
results continue to hold when this range is enlarged.
9Our initial guess is  (wt) = . The convergence to the equilibrium function at any desired
accuracy is reasonably fast.
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from the previous step yields ex-ante welfare. By repeating this exercise for di¤erent
values of , we obtain ~ and ~W .
We have analytically established that when  = 1 (log utility), ~ = 1 and ~ > 1:
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Figure 1(a) shows that ~ > 1 for all ; and Figure 1(b) shows that ~  1 for all .10
Figure 1(a): Optimal  against  (endowment shocks)
Figure 1(b): Optimal  against  (endowment shocks)
10The ~ curve for w = 0 the i.i.d. case follows the same shape as the other two, is tangential
to them at  = 1, and lies strictly below w = 0:5 at all other . If presented together, ~ for
w = 0:9 becomes indistinguishable from the x -axis.
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As under log utility, ~ > 1 reduces the net-of-transfer income volatility. Figure 1(a)
shows that for any given w, ~ is increasing in . Intuitively, as  gets higher i.e., the
utility is more concave, the income volatility hurts more. A more aggressive policy
response is needed and thus ~ is increasing in . Figure 1(a) also shows that , for any
given , ~ is decreasing in w. Recall from the discussion following Lemma 2 that
net-of-transfers income volatility is decreasing in the persistence of the endowment
shocks. As a result, the policy is less aggressive, i.e., it gets closer to ~ = 1 as w
increases.
Why is ~ < 1 for all  6= 1? Roughly, when  < 1, the main factor that dominates
the policy choice is the banksdisproportionatelyhigh allocation on non-movers
consumption. This is because the bank perceives the consumption of the two types
as gross substitutes and the return on cash that goes to movers consumption is
uncertain. Then ~ < 1, by transferring resources to movers, aligns bankschoices
with what is ex-ante optimal.11 On the other hand, when  > 1, bankschoice of
deposits saved for movers is toovolatile over time. Ex-ante, ~ < 1 then provides
an appropriate compensation.12
Irrespective of the value of , the deviation of bankschoices from ex-ante optimal-
ity is primarily due to the moneys rate of return uncertainty. As the unconditional
distribution is preserved by assumption, an increase in the persistence of endowment
shocks implies a reduced spread of its next periods conditional distribution. As a
result, the banks choices are closer to what ex-ante optimality requires. This is ev-
ident from Figure 2 that shows that  is closer to the average and less steep as w
increases. This leads to the result shown in Figure 1(b): the policy is less aggressive
11A planner constrained by the fact that movers must consume from current endowment will
choose allocations such that ex-ante E (u0 (cm)) = x E (u0 (cn)). In a decentralized equilibrium
however the banks choice is governed by E (u0 (cm)Rm) = xE (u0 (cn)). Setting ~ < 1 aligns the
decentralized marginal condition with that of the planner.
12For technical details of this argument the reader is referred to Bhattacharya and Singh (2007),
who obtain similar results for i.i.d. shocks.
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as w increases, i.e., it gets closer to ~ = 1.
Figure 2:  as a function of w under monetary targeting
Figure 3 presents the percentage gain in steady state welfare, expressed in terms
of equivalent consumption, that is obtained under monetary targeting relative to
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ination targeting.
Figure 3: % change in ~ci from following ~ over ~
Proposition 3 showed that the welfare gap between monetary and ination tar-
geting is decreasing in w; the same holds for all . Figure 3 also shows that the
welfare gap is increasing in  for any given w. Intuitively, a relatively higher income
volatility under ination targeting hurts more as  increases, thus making monetary
targeting even more desirable.
In the next section, we study uncertainty regarding the return to the storage
technology. In that case, as we demonstrate below, the higher the persistence of the
storage return shocks, the larger is the welfare gain under the welfare-superior regime.
4 Uncertain return on storage
In this section, we shut o¤ the endowment uncertainty and instead allow the return
on storage to be uncertain. Specically, we assume that each unit of the consumption
good stored at date t  1 yields xt units at the start of date t. Further xt is assumed
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to follow an AR(1) process:
xt   xe = x (xt 1   xe) + "t; and "t  i.i.d.
where it is assumed that xe > 1; "t 2 ["; "]with Et 1 f"tg = 0 and represents shocks
to the real interest rate: The above process implies that xt is distributed over supporth
xe + "
1 x ; x
e + "
1 x
i
and its unconditional mean and variance are given by xe > 1
and 2x  
2
"
1 2x , respectively. Conditionally, however, E fxtjxt 1g = (1  x)x
e +
xxt 1. It is further assumed that E fxtjxt 1g > 1 for all xt 1; which requires that
xe+ x
1 x " > 1 or " >  
1 x
x
(xe   1). This ensures that a strictly positive amount of
storage is held by banks at all times.
Our goal is to repeat the previous set of exercises, i.e., investigate how optimal
monetary policy responds to real interest rate shocks, and in particular, on the per-
sistence (x) of such shocks. Since the structure of the results is roughly similar to
those presented above for endowment shocks, we will necessarily be more brief in
their presentation below.
In the case of log utility, t =  for all t; in particular,  is independent of x:
Under monetary targeting, since mt =  (w +  t) and  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt

1  1


, it
follows that mt =  w=

1  

1  1


for all t. Further,
Rmt =
pt
pt+1
=
1

mt+1
mt
=
1

:
Under ination targeting, Rmt = 1 for all t. Further, mt =  (w +  t) and  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt   1mt 1. In turn, mt =   1  1mt 1 + 1 w. In a stationary equilib-
rium, mt =  w=
 
1    1  1


for all t. Thus, in either case the indirect utility is
given by
W z =   ln z+(1  )Et flnxt+1jxtg+lnw ln

1 + 

1  1
z

for z = ; : (22)
Proposition 4 Irrespective of the specication of shocks to storage returns, monetary
and ination targeting are equivalent under logarithmic utility. The optimal rule
requires xing the money supply or equivalently the price level.
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Under log preferences, banks always spend  fraction of deposits to acquire cash
reserves. For a xed money supply, the net-of-transfers income is also simply the
endowment  in this case, the banks keep aside a fraction  of the endowment to
purchase cash. Prices are constant period after period and the rate of return on
money is unity. The same equilibrium obtains if prices were instead xed. But,
why is a constant money supply optimal? To answer this, compare (22) with (16).
The terms containing  are independent of current and/or future return on storage.
Once again, optimal monetary policy ignores the intergenerational margin and ~ = 1
obtains an e¢ cient intragenerational margin.
Does this result continue to hold in the more general CRRA form of utility? We
now show that the equivalence of the two instruments described in Proposition 4
breaks down when the storage shocks are persistent, i.e., x > 0. Under ination tar-
geting, the rate of return on money is xed;i.e., Rmt =  1 for all t. The equilibrium
t [denoted  (; xt)] is readily obtained from (6) as
 (; xt) =

+ (1  ) 1 
h
Et
n
x 1t+1 jxt
oi  1

(23)
However, under monetary targeting, uncertain storage returns also contribute to re-
turn on money uncertainty. In this case,  (; xt) is obtained from (6) as
 (; xt) =

+ (1  )

 (;xt)
1 (;xt)(1  1)
  1

"
Et
(
x 1t+1

1 (;xt+1)(1  1)
(;xt+1)
 1 xt
)#  1

(24)
As is evident, the current  does depend on the return to storage in the following
period. If x is persistent, the distribution of xt+1 is contingent on xt and in turn t
is a function of xt; otherwise not (as the following Proposition makes clear).
Proposition 5 For CRRA utility, under i:i:d: shocks to storage returns (x = 0),
monetary targeting and ination targeting are equivalent. In either case, the best rule
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involves xing the money supply or equivalently the price level. If x > 0 holds, the
equivalence breaks down.
When banks allocate their deposits into cash and storage, the return on either
of them is not known. While the return on storage is unknown by assumption, the
return on money depends on the future price level which in turn depends on next
periods allocations. When the return to storage is i.i.d., its current realization does
not help predict its future values. Then t is independent of xt. As all other exogenous
variables, including the money growth rate, are constant,  is time-invariant, and so
are the transfers and deposits at the bank. Once again, prices grow at the money
growth rate. The rate of return on money and real balances are constant, which also
means that moversconsumption is constant over time.
Why is ~ = 1 then? Notice that in the decentralized equilibrium movers directly
consume a constant fraction of endowment, whereas the non-movers consume only
stored goods with uncertain returns. From a planners perspective a unit of endow-
ment that goes to movers obtains u0 (cm) whereas a unit reserved for non-movers
obtains Et fxt+1u0 (cnt)g. Equating the two and then comparing with (4) obtains
~ = 1.
On the other hand, when shocks are persistent xt does help in predicting xt+1
and then t does depend on xt. A constant money supply does not lead to a sta-
tionary prices anymore, and the equivalence breaks down. What optimal money
growth/ination rates obtain for x > 0 (and  6= 1)? Which targeting regime is
superior for di¤erent values of ? As before, we resort to numerical simulations. Our
choice of parametric specication is as follows. We x  = 0:2 and assume that the
long-run distribution of x is log-normal. For the AR(1) specication, we assume
lnx = x lnxt 1 + "t,
where "  N ( (1  x) ; 2x (1  2x)) ; x = 0 obviously nests the i.i.d. specication.
Below we present results for x = 0:5; 0:8, and 0.85. We compare optimal money
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growth and ination rates under the two policies, along with their respective welfare
levels, for  2 [0:5; 2:1].
We rst rewrite the expression for period t welfare as (see (21))
Wt 
(1  ) (w +  t)1  (1  t) Et

x1 t+1 jxt

  1
1   =


t

(w +  t)
1 Et (Rmt)  1
1   :
(25)
Under ination targeting, it is clear from (23) that t depends on the current real-
ization of xt. As  varies stochastically over time, so will the net-of-transfers income
that, following (13), is governed by
( w +  t+1) =    (; xt)
(1   (; xt)) ( w +  t) +
w
1   (; xt) : (26)
With (23) and (26) it is straightforward to numerically simulate (25) over a large
number of time periods. An average then obtains the ex-ante utility for any given .
As under endowment uncertainty, ~ is obtained as argmax (W ). Under monetary
targeting, the main step entails computing the xed point of  as a function of x. As
under endowment shocks, we guess an initial function  = , and numerically iterate
on (24) to convergence. This is done for a xed . Once the  function is obtained,
evaluating (25) is straightforward. By repeating this exercise for di¤erent values of
, we easily obtain ~ and ~W .
Figure 4 below shows that, just as in the case of endowment shocks, ~  1 for all
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. Interestingly, ~ ? 1 for all  ? 1 obtains.
Figure 4: Optimal  and  against  (storage shocks)
For the log case, we know from Proposition 4 that ~ = ~ = 1 for all x. For x > 0
and  6= 1, as the discussion following Proposition 5 claries, t uctuates and so does
 t. Then, as under endowment shocks, a higher  helps reduce the income volatility
as apparent from (26), and therefore the policy intervention is inationary. Why is
~ ? 1 for  ? 1? Intuitively, the uncertainty of storage returns hits the non-movers
consumption directly; its impact on the portfolio choice , based on future expecta-
tions, is only indirect and relatively minor. Thus, non-moversconsumption relative
to moversconsumption is more volatile. An optimal policy tends to transfer income
to non-movers when  > 1, i.e., when the two consumptions are gross complements.
This is achieved by ~ > 1. The opposite is the case when  < 1.
Figure 4 also shows that, in sharp contrast to the policy responses under endow-
ment shocks, the optimal money growth and ination rate responses amplify with
an increase in the persistence of storage shocks. Intuitively, as persistence increases,
current realizations of storage returns are closer to its next periods predicted value
(see the discussion following Proposition 5). As a result, bankschoices respond more
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to the current shocks. The optimal policy responses then have to be more aggressive.
Finally, Figure 5 below shows that ~W  ? ~W  as  ? 1.
Figure 5: % change in ~ci from following ~ over ~
A rough intuition for this result is as follows. Relative to monetary targeting, a
xed ination target ensures a better intratemporal e¢ ciency but generates a higher
intertemporal income volatility. For the log case none of these e¤ects are present.
When the elasticity of substitution is low relative to the log case (i.e.,  > 1), the
welfare cost of a higher income volatility exceeds its benets in terms intratemporal
e¢ ciency. The opposite is the case when  < 1.
5 Conclusion
In recent years, the random relocation model has become an important vehicle for
research in monetary theory in the overlapping-generations tradition. Most work
using this model has been done in a deterministic environment; in the few instances
where shocks are allowed, they are restricted to be i.i.d. in nature. In this paper,
we extend the scope of use of such models to the case of persistent shocks. We use
32
the structure to study the tug-o-war for supremacy between ination targeting and
monetary targeting, a classic yet timely topic in monetary economics. It is useful to
note that absent shocks, there would be no di¤erence between these instruments in
our model.
We study shocks to the endowment as well as shocks to the real interest rate. We
are able to obtain clean analytical results (with accompanying intuition) for the case of
logarithmic utility. The analysis plays o¤two margins the intratemporal e¢ ciency
or intragenerational e¢ ciencycondition connecting marginal utilities of movers and
non-movers at any date and the intergenerational margin that appears here because
shocks hit generations asymmetrically. In contrast to standard versions of these
models, the optimal policy in our setup pays attention to providing some amount
of intergenerational insurance. The net result is a trade-o¤ between intratemporal
for intertemporal e¢ ciency and this causes optimal monetary policy to deviate from
whatever policy achieves intratemporal e¢ ciency alone.
Irrespective of the nature of shocks, the optimal ination target is always posi-
tive. Under monetary targeting, shocks to endowment require negative money growth
rates, while under shocks to real interest rates it may be either positive or negative
depending on the elasticity of consumption substitution. Also, monetary targeting
welfare-dominates ination-rate targeting but the gap between the two vanishes as
the shock process approaches a random walk. In sharp contrast, for shocks to the real
interest rate, we prove that monetary targeting and ination targeting are welfare-
equivalent only in the limit when the shocks become i.i.d.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Under ination targeting, the money supply follows an AR(1) process
mt =  mmt 1 +

1   wt;
which (under a moving-average representation) can be iteratively written as:
mt =

1  
1X
s=0
( m)swt s; (27)
Next, w is governed by
wt = wwt 1 + "t; "t  i.i.d..
Let E f "tg = we (1  w) and 2" = 2w (1  2w) so that the unconditional mean
and variance are identical under the two specications. Under a moving-average
representation wt =
P1
s=0 (w)
s "t s, which after substituting in (27) yields
mt =

1  
26664
P1
s=0 
s
w"t s   m
P1
s=1 
s 1
w "t s
+2m
P1
s=2 
s 2
w "t s   3m
P1
s=3 
s 3
w "t s
+::::
37775 :
Combining the time-indexed shock terms yields
mt =

1  
26664
"t + (w   m) "t 1 + (2w   mw + 2m) "t 2+
(3w   m2w + 2mw   3m) "t 3+
(4w   m3w + 2m2w   3mw + 4m) "t 4 + ::::
37775 : (28)
To compute 2m, use equation (28) to obtain (using 
2
" = 
2
w (1  2w))
2m =
2
(1  )2
2
w
 
1  2w

266666664
1 + 2w

1  m
w
2
+ 4w

1  m
w
+

m
w
22
+6w

1  m
w
+

m
w
2
 

m
w
32
+8w

1  m
w
+

m
w
2
 

m
w
3
+

m
w
42
+ :::
377777775
:
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(29)
Notice that the expression with the square brackets in the RHS remains identical
by interchanging w with m. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that
w > m in what follows. To simplify notation, let x  w < 1 and y  mw < 1.
Then, the above leads to
2m =
2
(1  )2
2
w
 
1  2w
 "
1 +

x
1  y2
1 + y
2
+

x2
1 + y3
1 + y
2
+

x3
1  y4
1 + y
2
+ ::::+
#
;
After expanding the terms within square brackets, making use of summation formulae
for innite series,13 and substituting back x = w and y =
m
w
leads to
2m =
2
(1  )2
 
1  2w

2w

1 +
1
(w + m)
2

4w
1  2w
  2 
2
m
2
w
1 + wm
+
4m
1  2m

;
(30)
which is the equation (18) in Lemma 1.
Now, we show that 2m is monotonically declining in w. To do so we show that
d2m
dw
is negative for w = 0, w ! 1, and w = m, for any value of m 2 (0; 1). It
directly follows from (30) that
d2m
dw

w=0
=  2 
2
(1  )2
2
w
m
(1  2m)
< 0:
13The terms within square brackets can be expanded and recollected as
1 +

x
1  y2
1 + y
2
+

x2
1 + y3
1 + y
2
+

x3
1  y4
1 + y
2
+ ::::+
= 1 + x2
1 + y4   2y2
(1 + y)
2 + x
4 1 + y
6 + 2y3
(1 + y)
2 + x
6 1 + y
8   2y4
(1 + y)
2 + :::
= 1 +
1
(1 + y)
2
24  x2 + x4 + x6 + :::+  x2y4 + x4y6 + x6y8 + :::
 2  x2y2   x4y3 + x6y4   :::
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= 1 +
1
(1 + y)
2

x2
1  x2 +
x2y4
1  x2y2   2
x2y2
1 + x2y

= 1 +
x2
(1 + y)
2

1
1  x2 +
y4
1  x2y2   2
y2
1 + x2y

:
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Similarly, after some algebra it can be shown that
(1  )2
22w
d2m
dw

w=1
=  2 + 4
(1 + m)
2  
2
(1 + m)
3 + 4
2m
(1 + m) (1 + m)
2   2
4m
(1  2m) (1 + m)2
=  2 + 2
(1  m) (1 + m)3

2
 
1  2m

+
 
22m   1

(1  m)  4m

= 2

 1 + 1
(1  m) (1 + m)3

1 + m   23m   4m

:
Now,
1 + m   23m   4m < (1  m) (1 + m)3 :
To see this expand the RHS and simplify to get
m < 2m;
which must hold for all m > 0. Hence,
d2m
dw

w=1
< 0: Finally,
(1  )2
22w
d2m
dw

w=m
=  2m

1 +
1
42m

  2
4
m
1 + 2m
+
24m
1  2m

 2 (1  
2
m)
83m

24m
1  2m
  2 
4
m
1 + 2m

+
(1  2m)
42m

43m   25m
(1  2m)2
  4
3
m + 2
5
m
(1 + 2m)
2

=  m  
1
2
3m
(1  2m)
  (1  
2
m)
42m
43m + 2
5
m
(1 + 2m)
2 < 0;
since all the terms in the last equality are negative.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Using (30) it is straightforward to obtain
2m
8>>><>>>:
= 
22w
(1 )2 2=2 , if w = 0
= 
22w
(1 )2+2=2 , if w = m
= 
22w
(1 +=)2 ; as w ! 1
: (31)
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Next, using (31) and (34), it is easily shown that (for any ~ > 0)
2m
(me)2
2w
(we)2
8>>><>>>:
= ((1 )~+)
2
(1 )2~2 2 > 1 for w = 0
= ((1 )~+)
2
(1 )~2+2 > 1 for all w = m 2 (0; 1)
= 1 as w ! 1
:
C Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting (19):
W  =   ln    ln+ (1  ) ln x+ E (lnm ()) ; (32)
where the distribution of m is governed by (13). We rst take a second-order Taylor
approximation of the last term around me:
E flnmg ' lnme   1
2
2m
(me)2
: (33)
Recall that me = 
1 
we
1+m
= w
e
1 += . Then,
2m
(me)2
=
(1  )2
2 (we)2
2m (1 + m)
2 : (34)
We are interested in di¤erentiating (32) w.r.t. . As m =

1 
1

and dm
d
=   
1 
1
2
,
for future use, we rst prove that d
dm
2m (1 + m)
2 > 0. We show that this holds for
m ! 0, m = w 2 (0; 1), and m < 1. First, from (30) it is clear that as m ! 1,
2m ! +1. Next, using (29), one can derive
1
2w
1
1  2w

1  

2
d
dm

2m (1 + m)
2
= 2 (1 + m)
26664
1 + (w   m)2 + (2w   mw + 2m)2
+(3w   m2w + 2mw   3m)2
+(4w   m3w + 2m2w   3mw + 4m)2 + :::
37775
+(1 + m)
2
26666664
2 (m   w) + 2 (2w   mw + 2m) (2m   w)+
2 (3m   w2m + 2wm   3w) (32m   2mw + 2w)
+2 (4w   m3w + 2m2w   3mw + 4m) 
(43m   32mw + 2m2w   3w) + ::::::
37777775 :
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As m ! 0, the terms within the rst square bracket equals 11 2w while that in the
second equals  2w
1 2w . Then the RHS reduces to
22w
1+w
> 0. Finally, when m = w, all
the terms above are either zero or positive.
Notice however from (31) that as w ! 1, 2m (1 + m)2 = 
2
(1 )2
2
w, and therefore
d
dm
2m (1 + m)
2 = 0 as w ! 1. Thus, while the result above is valid for all w 2
[0; 1), it is not valid in the limit.
Using (34) with (33) in (32), and di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
dW 
d
=  

+

2
1  + 

  1
2
(1  )2
2 (we)2
d

2m (1 + m)
2
dm
dm
d|{z}
=  
1 
1
2
=



1
(1  ) +    1

+
1
2
(1  )
 (we)2
d

2m (1 + m)
2
dm
:
Thus, for all w 2 [0; 1),
dW 
d

=1
=
1
2
(1  )
 (we)2
d

2m (1 + m)
2
dm
> 0;
which, assuming W  is concave in , implies ~ > 1. As w ! 1, dWd

=1
= 0. Thus
limw!1 ~ = 1.
D Proof of Proposition 3
We start by computing the maximized value of stationary welfare under monetary
targeting, denoted by ~W . From (17), it can be checked that at  = 1;
~W  = (1  ) ln x+ E flnwg :
Analogous to (33), we can write E flnwg ' lnwe   1
2
2w
(we)2
and so
~W  = (1  ) ln x+ lnwe   1
2
2w
(we)2
:
Denote by W ; the maximized value of stationary welfare under ination targeting.
From (19), it follows that
~W  =   ln ~   ln+ (1  ) ln x+ E (lnm (~)) ;
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where it is known from Proposition 2 that ~ > 1: Using (33) with me = w
e
1 += ,
note that
~W    ~W  =  ln ~ + ln

1  + 
~

| {z }
>0
+
1
2
0BBB@ 2m(me)2   2w(we)2| {z }
>0
1CCCA > 0: (35)
Di¤erentiating the rst two terms,  ln ~+ ln
 
1  + 
~

; with respect to ~ yields a
turning point at ~ = 1 and ~ = 1: Checking the second derivative reveals that the
sign is positive at ~ = 1 implying that  ln ~+ln
 
1  + 
~

is a global minimum at
~ = 1 and so the minimum value of  ln ~ + ln
 
1  + 
~

= 0. From Proposition 2
~ > 1 for all w < 1, and therefore,  ln ~ + ln
 
1  + 
~

> 0 for all w < 1. That
the last term in brackets is positive follows from Lemma 2.
E Proof of Proposition 5
First, consider a xed ination target . Then Rmt =  1 for all t, and  is given by
from (6) as
 =

+ (1  ) 1 
h
Et
n
x1 t+1 jxt
oi 1

:
Since x is i.i.d.,  only depends on  as can be seen from the above equation, i.e.,
 is constant over time. This policy implies a constant money growth rate given by
t =
Mt+1
Mt
= mt+1
mt
 =  for all t; since mt = w for all t. Thus, monetary and
ination targeting are equivalent with any  = .
For notational convenience below, letX 
h
Et
n
x1 t+1
oi 1

. Using w+ = w
1 (1  1)
along with the above expression for  after replacing  with  in (25), the ex-ante
welfare can be written as
W () =
(1  )
1   X

0@ w
1  

1  1


1A1 
0BBBB@ (1  )
1 
 X
+ (1  ) 1  X| {z }
1 
1CCCCA
 
  1
1  :
The rst order condition for welfare maximizing money growth/ination rate is ob-
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tained by di¤erentiating the above with respect to :
dW ()
d
= (1  )
0@ w
1  

1  1


1A  (1  )  w
1  

1  1

2 2
  (1  )
0@ w
1  

1  1


1A  (1  )  w
1  

1  1

2 1  1

d
d
 
0@ w
1  

1  1


1A1  (1  )  1 
+ (1  ) 1  X
2 1  

(1  )X 1   1:
Evaluate the above at  = 1; the second term is zero. The rest can be simplied to
(after again using  = 
+(1 )
1 
 X
1

) :
dW ()
d

=1
= (1  )
0@ w
1  

1  1


1A1  (1  ) 
0@ 1
1  

1  1

 
2
  

1A
= 0:
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